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ROBERT HOLLAND
GREEK - TURKISH RELATIONS, ISTANBUL AND BRITISH 
RULE IN CYRPUS, 1954-59: SOME EXCERPTS FROM 
THE BRITISH PUBLIC ARCHIVE
Of the roles played by governments outside Cyprus in the quarrel over the 
island’s future between the late summer of 1954, when it was first debated in 
the United Nations General Assembly, and the Lancaster House agreements of 
February 1959, that of Turkey remains probably the least transparent (indeed, 
arguably as obscure as that of General Grivas’ role inside the island). Even 
assuming linguistic competence, access to the official Turkish documents of the 
period is out of the question. Nevertheless, much can be deduced about Turk­
ish attitudes and calculations from documentation available in other centres. 
The following extracts from British Foreign Office records released under the 
«thirty year rule» provide insights into the shifting positions taken by the 
regime of Adnan Menderes, and the volatile relations between Turkey, Greece 
and the United Kingdom which developed.
One basic aspect to the connection between Ankara and London over 
Cyprus may be pointed out at the start. The head of the British Foreign 
Office’s Southern Department responsible for Greek and Turkish affairs (in­
cluding Cyprus) stated early on in the dispute that «On a long view I think that 
what one might call the ‘Turkish-political’ factor may become more important 
[for Britain] than Her Majesty’s Government’s actual need for a base in Cy­
prus»1. It is undoubtebly true that the politics of relations with Turkey became 
much more of a driving force within British policy-making than the increasing­
ly fragile conception of Cyprus’ strategic significance. What the nature of the 
‘Turkish-political’ factor might have been can be gleaned at least in part from 
the material presented in this article.
1. J. Ward to F. Shattock 5 April 1956 F0371/123882, Public Record Office, United King­
dom (hereafter PRO).
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The origins of Anglo-Turkish interaction over Cyprus lay in the tactics 
surrounding the Greek reference of the issue to the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1954. In particular, during the run-up to the UN session there was 
mounting concern in London that the Turkish Government might not give 
Britain firm support. On 29 March the senior official responsible for Cyprus in 
the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned the British Ambassador that 
«They [Turkey] considered the Cyprus question to be an Anglo-Greek one...»2. 
After the Athenian newspaper, Ethnos, had reported on 6 June that Turkey 
would in fact prove accommodating to Greek proposals should the matter go 
to New York, one of the senior officials in the southern Department noted as 
follows:
I am informed that the Turkish Foreign Minister has given an official 
promise that his Government will not actively oppose Greece ’s efforts to 
secure a favourable decision from [the] United Nation Organization’s 
General Assembly on the question of the union of Cyprus with Greece. 
This does not mean, however, that Turkey will support or vote for a 
Greek proposal or that she considers the moment suitable for bringing 
the question of Cyprus before the United Nations. She will rather main­
tain a neutral attitude. Moreover, should the question take an acute turn 
during the General Assembly discussion, the Turkish delegation will try 
to suggest [a] means of settlement capable of easing the tension... You 
may think it wise to give the Turks further encouragement to keep them 
up to the mark. It would, of course, severely damage our position in the 
United Nations if the Turks were to adopt a neutral attitude on the 
question of considering Cyprus on the Assembly agenda3.
It is striking that in the early summer of 1954 the prospect of Turkish 
support, however tepid, for the Greek claim to Cyprus was something that had 
to be taken seriously. This must be seen in the context of Turkey’s wider 
priorities in the period leading up to the signature of the Balkan Pact between 
herself, Greece and Yugoslavia. Even at this stage Turkey was not disinterested 
in the future of Cyprus, but she was determined to «keep in the background» 
and ensure that, whatever damage the United Kingdom’s determination to 
maintain her sovereignty over Cyprus might do to Anglo-Greek relations, that 
it did not harm the fabric of the historic Greco-Turkish rapprochement. Con­
versely, in London it was felt that the Turks had no right to «hide their heads» 
in any Cyprus debate, especially as Turkey’s ambivalence was a fatal weakness 
in Britain’s lobbying campaign with other countries. The British Ambassador 
in Ankara, Sir James Bowker, reported to London on August 27 1954 respect-
2. Sir James Bowker to Foreign Office 30 March 1954 C0926/183, PRO.
3. D. Smith to R. Wilding 15‘July 1954 F0371/112848 WG1081/192.
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ing the mobilization of Turkish diplomacy which he had been instructed to 
bring about:
In the course of [an] interview yesterday to which he had summoned me, 
the Turkish Prime Minister referred to my representations on this subject 
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and said he would like to discuss the 
matter himself with me in the light of action taken by the Turkish Go­
vernment.
His Excellency said that Turkish representatives in all UN countries, 
except Greece, had been instructed to explain fully to the Government to 
which they were accredited, Turkey’s view about the insertion of Cyprus 
on the UN agenda. Reports on the response to this communication were 
now coming in. After further discussion of the suggestions in your tele­
gram No. 558 to Ankara, the Prime Minister finally undertook to (a) 
send immediate instructions to Turkish representatives in Scandinavian 
countries to follow up earlier representations... (b) to instruct Turkish 
representatives in other capitals to make further representations in cases 
where the response to the first approach indicated intention of the Go­
vernment concerned to abstain, and try to induce them to oppose: and 
(c) to send a personal message to Mr. Dulles4.
Of these three elements, it may be said that the last was the most vital, since 
for the British Foreign Office using up Turkish credit in Washington rather 
than its own was an important consideration. British cajolements along these 
lines continued until early October, when it was concluded in London that the 
Turks were now suitably aroused over Cyprus and could be left «to make the 
running»5. A significant point arising from this sequence is that from the first 
the British were put in the unsatisfactory position of being supplicants for 
Turkish help. The leaders of the Turkish government were naturally quick to 
grasp the possibilities this opened up for the advancement of their own inter­
ests.
Over the ensuing months, nevertheless, Turkey remained for the most part 
on the sidelines of the Cyprus dispute, the focus of attention being the deterio­
ration in relations between London and Athens and, more significantly, a 
worsening of the political situation in the colony itself. The outbreak of vio­
lence on the island on 1st April 1955 inevitably had the effect of defining 
Turkish opinions more sharply. On 19 April Michael Stewart, Bowker’s deputy 
in Ankara, wrote to London with a description of local reactions to the out­
break of violence:
4. Her Majesty’s Consul-General (Istanbul) to Foreign Office, Telegram No. 290 August 27 
1954 F0317/112854 WG1081/353.
5. B. Muirhead 18 October 1954 F0371/112869 WG1981/836.
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The strong Turkish press reaction to the recent outbreaks of terrorism in 
Cyprus, reported in our Sa vingram no. 19 of April 5, has continued but there is 
now an increasing tendency to criticise the Cyprus Government for its hand­
ling of the situation.
This tendency has not been helped by the wild and exaggerated statement 
made on his arrival here by Fazil Küçük, the Secretary-General of the Cyprus 
National Turkish Union and reported in Ankara telegrams nos. 266and 267 of 
April 16. Several Turkish newspapers, including the largest in the country, 
HÜRRIYET, which has always maintained a close interest in Cyprus, have sent 
correspondents to the island to follow the situation and most of their reports 
have been extremely critical of the supposedly ineffectual way in which the 
Cyprus authorities have handled the Greek terrorism.
A fairly large section of the press is taking the line that British policy aims 
to set Turks and Greeks on the island at each others’ throats so that the 
problem can be shown to the world as merely a private quarrel between the two 
communities. There has been no lack of news reports supporting this view: one 
such report claimed that Turkish houses in Cyprus had been included in a 
search for arms, while another referred to an event during the Coronation 
when a group of Turkish youths helped the police to deal with a gang of 
Greeks who had torn down the British flag. Instead of thanking the Turks for 
their help, the Cyprus Government is supposed to have claimed that the inci­
dent was proof that the problem on the island was due to enmity between the 
Turkish and Greek communities.
Even moderate press comment here has adopted a less favourable line than 
hitherto towards British policy. The vexed question of Turkish rights, includ­
ing of course Evkaf, and the supposed discrimination in favour of the Cypriot 
Greeks ha ve been trotted out and there has been fairly widespread support for 
a statement made here by Faiz Kaymak, President of the Turkish Associations 
in Cyprus, implying that the only hope for the Turkish community in Cyprus 
lay in the Government of their mother country since the colonial administra­
tion had failed to protect their rights.
Although no cases of Greek terrorism directed against Turks have been 
reported here, most of the press has referred to the dangerous position in 
which the Cypriot Turks find themselves (one paper even wrote of Greek 
atrocities against the Turkish community) and to the need for protection (in a 
more direct sense) by the Turkish Government. In another statement here 
Kaymak claimed that the Turks were being forced to leave their villages and 
take refuge in the towns because of the danger of Greek attacks against them.
A statement by the United States Ambassador in Athens to foreign press 
correspondents aroused comment in the Turkish press. We ha ve so far had no 
report from Athens on the speech but, according to the version in the semi-of­
ficial Anatolian Agency, the Ambassador was somewhat equivocal and im­
plied that at the right time the American Government might be able to lend its
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support to the Greek claim on Cyprus, but that this was impossible at the 
moment in view of the confused and dangerous position of the world. One 
writer thereupon accused the United States of having interfered in a matter 
concerning only Britain and Turkey and of supporting the Greek policy on 
Cyprus.
Throughout this violent and often garbled reaction the constant theme, of 
course, has been repeated emphasis that Turkey will never in any circumstan­
ces agree to the island being ceded to Greece and that she will take the neces­
sary action in the event of any move in this direction by Britain. Although the 
view is still maintained that Turkey is happy as long as Britain remains on the 
island and guarantees the rights of the Turkish minority.
So far in all this the Turkish Government has remained aloof and has made 
no official pronouncement. Küçük and Kaymak have requested an audience 
with the Turkish Prime Minister, but this has not yet been given. (In this 
connection see Ankara telegram no. 267.) It is stated that the object of their 
visit is to see Turkish statesmen in order to obtain guarantees about the Cypri­
ot Turkish community and directives about future policy of the Turks on the 
island, and we shall report further when it is concluded.
You will have seen from Ankara telegram no. 271 that the Prime Minister 
has now asked about the situation in the island and expressed concern about 
the Turkish community6.
It is suggestive that from this account the Turkish Government had yet 
remained relatively calm in its response to events in Cyprus. Nevertheless, its 
confidence in the effectiveness of British rule on the island was diminished, and 
although the Turkish leadership kept Fazil Küçük at arm’s length, it did begin 
to look for some means of political insurance. This took the form of an 
immediate demand for direct access to British thinking and decisions over 
Cyprus, partly to ensure that Turkish desiderata did not go by default, but also 
to give Turkish officials the opportunity to accurately gauge British intentions 
(and not least their progress against EOKA on the security front). A Foreign 
Office official responded as follows to the initial Turkish request to be fully 
consulted on Cypriot affairs:
This is a disturbing but natural development. The Turks are (a) naturally 
rattled by the recent disorders in Cyprus and afraid that we shall be 
bundled out (b) taking advantage of their position as our only and 
essential supporter to raise their price in terms of ha ving an increased say
6. Michael Stewart to W. H. Young (Foreign Office), 19 April 1955 F0371/117631 
RGC1081/326.
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in Cyprus affairs. So far the [Turkish] Government has been restrained 
but they may not remain so.
Apart from restoring order in Cyprus, a need which this development 
underlines, we can only do our best to appease the Turks by giving them 
full information about our intentions, whilst continuing to make clear 
that we, not they, rule the island7.
The advantage Turkey increasingly derived from being Britain’s only se­
rious source of support during the Cyprus troubles of the 1950s requires em­
phasis. British failure to scotch EOKA during the first six months or so of its 
operations was also crucial in causing Turkey to meditate on what shape the 
succession to colonial rule might take. Although officials and ministers in 
London were always aware of the danger that Turkey’s own claims could easily 
escalate if incautious encouragements were given, the logic of their own tactical 
embarassments progressively forced their hand into yielding that ‘consultation’ 
with Ankara which some warned was bound to be the thin end of a very dan­
gerous wedge.
The continuing unrest in Cyprus over the summer of 1955 led the British 
Government to call a tripartite international conference to consider the Cyprus 
question. This was essentially the initiative of the Foreign Secretary, Harold 
Macmillan, who from the first favoured international action to ‘smother’ the 
Cyprus dispute. The main concern of the Turkish Government was that an 
‘Anglo-Turkish position’ should be coordinated on an exclusive bilateral basis 
before the meeting assembled. In Britain some senior figures in the Colonial 
Office were highly critical of the whole conference method, with its explosive 
possibilities. But it was Macmillan and the Foreign Office who were in a 
position to give the «hare» a run. The following telegram was despatched by 
Harold Macmillan from Geneva to Prime Minister Eden on July 17 1955. It 
was composed after the Turkish Prime Minister had lodged a firm demand for 
‘collusion’ in advance of the London Conference, but also, significantly, im­
mediately after Macmillan had learned that the Greek Government had ex­
tended diplomatic ‘feelers’ of its own to Ankara:
Following from Secretary of State [for Prime Minister]:
I had certain scruples up to now about accepting Mr. Menderes’s sugges­
tions reported in your telegram No. 433, but since the Greeks are now 
trying to gang up with the Turks perhaps we need no longer be quite so 
scrupulous. While I do not think it would be wise to have any official 
discussion outside the ordinary diplomatic channel, I think the time has 
come when we might make it clear to the Turks that the Greeks are very 
wrong if they think we have called the conference merely to yield to their
7. R. Wilding 15 May 1955 ibid.
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demands. This is not at all our idea. The stronger the position the Turks 
take at the start, the better will be the result for us and for them. Mr. 
Zorlu spoke to me after the Ν.Λ.Τ.O. meeting. Not havingyet seen your 
telegram under reference, I did not encourage him as much as I would 
have done had I seen it, but I told him that some contact would be 
useful... Please make it clear that all this stuff about protection of minor­
ities is quite premature. I trust that the Turks will at the conference state 
quite firmly what they feel to be the right solution from their point of 
view8 9·.
It is worth remarking that as early as 1955 the possibility that Greece and 
Turkey might, out of the blue, come to an agreement of their own over Cyprus 
was something which called forth very strong British reactions. It is clear that 
the Turks received, in effect, an invitation, if not an explicit instruction, ‘to 
come out fighting’ at the conference against the Greeks. There was, naturally, 
always the danger that fighting in the conference chamber might spread 
beyond it. Certainly the potential usefulness of some physical expression of 
Turkish ‘feeling’ over Cyprus occurred to the British — as one foreign office 
official had already put it «A few riots in Ankara would do us nicely»9. It had 
also become obvious that the Greek community in Istanbul was a hostage to 
the Cyprus dispute. The anti-Greek riots in Istanbul which broke out on 
September 6 did not therefore come as a complete shock to those involved in 
the higher reaches of the dispute. The course of those disturbances was des­
cribed in a lengthy communication from Michael Stewart at the British Embas­
sy Residence in Istanbul to London on September 22. Since the details of the 
riots were not fully or accurately reported at the time, this despatch may be 
printed here in extenso:
In my unnumbered telegram of the 6th of September I reported that serious 
anti-Greek rioting had broken out in Istanbul that evening. I now have the 
honour to submit an account of the disturbances as they appear at a distance of 
some days. The immediate cause seems to have been a report received three or 
four hours earlier and published by two Istanbul papers in special evening 
editions that Atatiirk’s birthplace and the Turkish Consulate in Salonika had 
been attacked and blown up by Greek demonstrators. There is, however, good 
reason to believe that demonstrations on a very much smaller scale had been 
planned earlier to coincide more or less with the end of the London Conference 
on Cyprus. I will revert to this point later.
2. The bomb outrage in Salonica appears to have done little damage but the 
Turks in Istanbul and Izmir had already been worked into a state ofconsidera-
8. Harold Macmillan (United Kingdom Delegation to Four Power Talks, Geneva) to Foreign 
Office, Telegram No. 5, 17 July 1955 F0371/117643 RG1081/668.
9. Wilding minute 14 September 1954 F0371/112859 WG1081/500.
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ble excitement by uncompromising public statements on Cyprus made by the 
Turkish Foreign Minister during the London Conference and weeks of anti- 
Greek writing in the press, and the Salonika incident provided them with the 
convenient opportunity to display in a peculiarly brutal and useless way their 
hatred of the Greeks.
3. This Embassy’s first intimation of the rioting was the sound of breaking 
glass and shouting at about 8 o’ clock at an open-air night club immediately 
below the Embassy garden wall which faces the Golden Horn. It appears, 
however, that the demonstrations began about 6 o’ clock in Taksim Square, 
where a large crowd, excited by the news of the outrage in Salonica, were 
harangued by Hikmet Bil, the present President of the «Cyprus is Turkish» 
Association. The Police are reported to have tried to arrest Bil, who defied 
them with the support of the crowd, whereupon they made no further attempt 
to intervene. The speeches finished, the main part of the crowd started moving 
down Istiklâl Caddesi, the main street in Pera, while others went off in the 
direction of Ayazpa$a and along the main boulevard towards §i$li. The attacks 
on shops, the destruction of goods and property and to a much more limited 
extent the looting, then began. This was done with a method and determina­
tion which would have done credit to any thorough-going barbarian. Groups 
of young men armed with clubs and crowbars and under the Turkish flag 
—most groups had their own standard bearer— smashed the plate-glass or 
where necessary battered through steel shutters and systematically ransacked 
the shops, threw the contents into the street and trod it underfoot or otherwise 
destroyed it. Both from my own observations, I went out for an hour about 8 
o ’clock and again towards midnight, and from what I have heard from others, 
neither the Police nor the garrison troops who were out in some force by 8.30, 
made any real attempt to restrain the rioters. Indeed the Police in the Pera 
district, with the exception of four mounted officers who rode aimlessly up and 
down the main street, armed with hunting whips, which they were careful not 
to use, seemed to ha ve generally disappeared from the scene by 9 o’ clock. The 
Italian Ambassador, however, tells me that the Police were in evidence in some 
parts and effective in preventing damage to Italian property.
4. The troops, who were kept in side streets or paraded up and down the 
main street in trucks to the accompaniment of the applause of those who could 
take time off from the more engrossing occupation of pillage, were useless. 
Neither they nor the tanks, which appeared towards ten o’ clock, made any 
effort to intervene, nor did their presence have the slightest restraining effect 
on the rioters. By midnight there were probably no more than a dozen or 
twenty shops in the whole length of the Istiklâl Caddesi left intact and the 
street itself was carpeted with broken glass, sodden bales of cloth and wreckage 
of household goods and merchandise.
5.1 have not had any eyewitness account of what took place in other parts 
of the city, but from the wreckage on the 7th of September in the Beyazit area,
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the business centre of old Istanbul, it is clear that many minority shops were 
broken up. The Greek residential area of Kurtulu$ in new Istanbul was badly 
damaged. There was also great damage done in the Greek village of Samatya 
towards Florya, and in other Greek centres and in the islands of the Sea of 
Marmara, and generally whérever there were Greek or foreign communities.
6. The Embassy Residence and the Consulate General were in the centre of 
the rioting in Pera, and when it became clear that neither the Police nor the 
troops were willing or able to control the crowds —the solitary policeman who 
normally controls traffic outside our gates had disappeared some time earlier— 
I telephoned the Governor of Istanbul to protest against the lack of adequate 
protection for British lives and property and to ask for it to be provided 
without delay. The Governor was profuse in his assurances but in fact no sort 
of guard was put on the Embassy until Eve hours later.
7.1 have in my telegram No. 180 already given you a preliminary summary 
of the damage to British persons and property, and, in accordance with your 
instructions, a Note was presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs last week 
setting out the damage so far as we know it at present, reserving the right to 
claim compensation and asking for police protection for British lives and 
property in the future. Other foreign missions have done the same for their 
nationals and the Italian Ambassador told me on the 20th of September that he 
had suggested to the Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government might 
make a payment in advance of formal claims to meet some of the most imme­
diate needs of foreign nationals. I had already seen Count Pietromarchi on the 
8th of September to suggest that in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic 
Corps he might make some representations to the Turkish authorities about 
their failure to provide adequate protection for foreign property and persons, 
but His Excellency was not inclined to move at that time. Since then I gather 
that other diplomatic representatives have been urging the same course. In this 
connection I have noted your Legal Adviser’s opinion that the right to protest 
and to claim compensation can only be based on it being shown that the 
Turkish authorities failed to exercise due diligence. I do not, of course, know 
how an argument on this point would go in a Court of Law, and the Turkish 
Prime Minister in his speech in the National Assembly of the 12th of Sep­
tember was at some pains to defend the Istanbul Police. Nevertheless apart 
from the evidence of eyewitnesses, the Prime Minister has admitted foreknow­
ledge of demonstrations, the Minister of the Interior, who was in Istanbul 
during the rioting, has resigned and the Chief of Police, the Director of Securi­
ty, and three senior Generals in the Istanbul District Command have been 
dismissed. It strikes me therefore that the Turkish Government might have 
some difficulty in maintaining that the authorities had been as active in dealing 
with this incident as they should have been.
8.1 now return to the events of the night of the 6th of September. Itisclear, 
though it is naturally difficult to lay one’s hand on conclusive evidence, that
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the rioting was organised well in advance. Indeed the Government have admit­
ted as much. It broke out simultaneously all over Istanbul on the Asiatic and 
European side, and as far out as Therapia on the Bosphorus and the Marmara 
Islands. It is also fairly clear that there was some degree of Government 
connivance. The new Hilton Hotel, for instance, was heavily guarded by caval­
ry and police well before the demonstrations degenerated into rioting, and the 
Greek Consulate General and the Patriarchate were given effective military 
protection at an early stage. Hikmet Bil, the President of the «Cyprus is Tur­
kish Association» though now under arrest, spent an hour with the Prime 
Minister on the evening of the 5th of September, and I am reliably informed 
that the Government were aware of and had agreed to an anti-Greek demon­
stration to be organised under the auspices of the Association. This was to be 
limited to street demonstrations and the breaking of a few windows. The day 
planned for these events was to be the 9th of September, the anniversary of the 
final defeat of the Greeks in Izmir, but the bomb outrage in Salonica seemed to 
afford a more suitable occasion. There is other evidence of the Government’s 
foreknowledge which I will not detail here. I rather doubt whether, as Greek 
sources have suggested, the Salonica bomb incident was part of the plot.
9. The answer to the question of why, even with the Minister of the Interior 
present in Istanbul, the Turkish authorities allowed the city to be pillaged and 
burnt for five hours, is probably that everything depends on Monsieur Men- 
deres in this country. The Prime Minister, or, if not the Prime Minister himself, 
responsible people very close to him had agreed to a demonstration. The fact 
that the demonstration had turned to rioting with great risk to life and proper­
ty was not sufficient reason for taking action until the Prime Minister could be 
consulted; and the Prime Minister was on the train to Ankara and temporarily 
incommunicado. He was finally reached at Sapanca about 10 o ’ clock at night 
and, with the President of the Republic, returned to Istanbul immediately in a 
police car. At Pendik, a suburb about 20 miles outside the city, the seriousness 
of the situation was brought home to them when their car was stopped by a 
crowd shouting «Ewelâ mal, soma can» («first property, then life»). The Prime 
Minister reached Istanbul about half past eleven and on his orders, endorsed 
by President Bayar, the Army Command who had refused to act in answer to 
the appeals of the Governor, without written authority started to move troops 
in force into the city about midnight, too late to prevent the damage and too 
late to have stopped the rioters, many of whom, their job done, were by then 
roaming aimlessly round the city ready to go home or to sleep where they were. 
Martial Law was imposed shortly after midnight, lifted for a few hours the 
following morning, and then re-imposed until the National Assembly could 
meet to decide its duration. Martial Law under Article 86 of the Constitution 
consists of the suspension or temporary restriction of the inviolability of the 
person, the home, the freedom of the press, correspondence, association and 
incorporation.
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10. The first acts of the Government on the 7th of September were to recall 
the National Assembly for the 12th of September and subsequently to an­
nounce the re-imposition of Martial Law, a curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. (later 
reduced from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. and now from midnight to 4 a.m.), and to 
promise full compensation for the victims. All unofficial telegraphic corres­
pondence abroad was prohibited for some days. A large number of arrests, the 
present figures vary between three and four thousand, were also made. Presi­
dent Bayar, accompanied by the Prime Minister and the Governor of the city, 
who seems to have come fairly well out of the whole business, toured the city in 
the morning and made suitable and no doubt perfectly sincere speeches of 
regret and condemnation. By the afternoon gangs of workmen were clearing 
up the wreckage and in two or three days, except for the ubiquity of troops, 
gaping windows and broken shop fronts and a shortage of certain foodstuffs, 
Istanbul was getting itself back into some sort of shape to receive the Delegates 
for the International Bank and Monetary Fund Conference. There must, how­
ever, have been a good many Turks in those days, including the Prime Minis­
ter, who wished the Conference and the Delegates the other side of the Atlantic.
11. Simultaneously with these happenings in Istanbul serious rioting was 
taking place in Izmir and demonstrations which, but for the effective action of 
the Governor, might have degenerated into rioting, in Ankara. The pattern of 
events in Izmir was much the same as in Istanbul though the riots were on a 
smaller scale and more obviously limited to anti-Greek attacks. First, demon­
strations and then synchronised rioting throughout the city. The Greek Consu­
late, the Greek Pavilion at the Izmir Fair, the principal Greek Church and a 
number of Greek business and private houses were attacked, burnt or broken 
up. The security forces were largely inactive or ineffective, though troops 
prevented the complete destruction of the British Information Office, which 
was nevertheless damaged by the mob seeking the flat of a Greek doctor on the 
floor above. The mob also tried to reach the Greeks reported aboard the 
British ships, the m. v. «Brescia» and the s.s. «Livorno», but failed and did only 
minor damage. The police did not interfere but eventually troops intervened. 
One of the most serious incidents in its political implications was the attack on 
the residences of six Greek Officers attached to the NATO Headquarters, dur­
ing which a Colonel and his wife were cut and bruised. The Greek Consul- 
General, his family and staff were unmolested. Her Majesty’s Consular Repre­
sentatives in Trabzon and Iskenderun report that all was quiet in those two 
cities.
12. The Government’s explanation for these happenings was given by the 
Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister at the extraordinary session of 
the National Assembly on the 12th of September. A full summary of this was 
sent in my telegram No. 652 from Ankara. Briefly the demonstrations, of 
which the Government had foreknowledge, were the spontaneous expression 
of national feeling inflamed by the report of the intended massacre of Turkish
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Cypriots on the 28th of August (for the spreading of which incidentally the 
Turkish Government was solely responsible), and concern for their Cypriot 
brothers. The police and armed forces were understandably affected by the 
same «psychosis» which accounted for their hesitation and relative ineffective­
ness. But beyond the natural and to some extent legitimate activités of students 
and the like, there were dark forces, Red agents and ill-disposed individuals, 
who had momentarily succeeded in capitalising the feelings of the country and 
had brought disgrace and material disaster.
13. To blame the rioting on Red agents seems too easy and not very con- 
vincingwhen wehavebeen toldbythe Turkish Government for years past that 
such few Communists as there might be in Turkey were incapable of effective 
action. It is only fair to add here that this was also the Embassy’s independent 
view. Even the Turkish security authorities say that only sixty or seventy out of 
the total number of arrests are Communists. But ifit was not the Communists, 
who was it? It is reasonable to argue, as do some Turks, that part of the 
damage was done either by the poor in violent protest against the exorbitant 
cost of living, or by straightforward hooligans such as exist in every town. But 
these people, even if they added to the destruction, could not ha ve organised it. 
The most obvious alternative to the Communists is the «Cyprus is Turkish 
Association». This Association may have been responsible for much of the 
planning, for the systematic identification of Greek property, the organization 
of taxis for the demonstrators, the despatch of roving bands to the outlying 
Greek colonies and the transport to Istanbul of gangs from the provinces. It 
may also have been responsible for the instructions which must have been 
given to spare life, since only isolated cases of injury to persons have been 
reported. I do not, however, believe that the Association can be held responsi­
ble for the wave of methodical destruction which followed the early demon­
strations, nor for the wholesale ransacking and burning of Greek churches and 
schools, the widespread desecration of the §i$li cemetery, nor the attacks on 
the property of minorities other than Greek.
14. Another possibility is the local organization of the Democrat Party 
itself. There is fairly reliable evidence that local Democrat Party representa­
tives were amongst the leaders of the rioting in various parts of Istanbul, 
notably in the Marmara Islands, and it has been argued that only the Demo­
crat Party had the political organization in the country capable of demonstra­
tions on the scale that occurred. This is true, but I myself do not believe that 
the Party, as distinct from individual members, can be held to be consciously 
responsible for more than the opening stages. If this is so, we are still left with 
the question of who was. I do not know that we shall ever get an answer since 
whatever the conclusion of the official enquiry, the full report will probably 
never be published. But on the whole I am inclined to think that the work of 
destruction was led and carried out by extreme nationalists, to whom groups of 
trouble-makers, hooligans and anyone with a grudge against authority or 
riches attached themselves.
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15. It is clear from the manner in which Monsieur Menderes spoke to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer when the latter called on him on the 16th of 
September that the Turkish Government are most seriously concerned and 
fearful of further developments of the same kind. They have put Ankara, 
Istanbul and Izmir under Martial Law for six months and intend to subject 
workers’ and students’ associations to severe investigation and repression. In 
addition to the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of State particularly 
responsible for students’ and refugees’ affairs has resigned; a number of other 
Ministers have been moved to less immediately responsible appointments and 
the purge of the Security Services continues. Coming on top of the economic 
crisis and the absolute refusal at present of the United States Government to 
consider further financial aid to Turkey for any other than strictly military 
purposes, the position of the Government, and Monsieur Menderes personally, 
is far weaker than it has been since the Democrat Party first took office in 
1950.
16. The international consequences of the riots are probably equally serious 
to Turkey. Turco-Greek relations are very seriously damaged. A telegram from 
the United Kingdom Delegation at New York suggests that the Turks are not 
going to find much sympathy at the United Nations if Cyprus has to be 
debated, and Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Belgrade has reported that the 
Yugoslavs are highly critical. These reactions, as Sir Pierson Dixon has re­
marked, are not altogether fair since up to a fortnight ago it was the Greeks 
who were almost wholly responsible for the trouble. The memories of the 
Armenian atrocities, however, and similar episodes in Turkish history die 
hard, and, while the Istanbul and Izmir riots may ha ve been mild compared to 
what we read of in North Africa or what is liable to happen at almost any time 
in the Middle East, I have met very few foreigners, resident or visitors, of 
whom there were hundreds in Instabul during the last ten days, who do not 
regard the riots as disgraceful and as irrefutable evidence that Turkey has 
many, many years to go before she can fairly claim to stand as an equal with 
the West.
17. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty’s Ambassadors at 
Athens, Belgrade and Washington, to the Governor of Cyprus and to the Head 
of the British Middle East Office10.
Undoubtedly the anti-Greek riots, whilst consciously planned in some as­
pects, got out of control, but then one does not plan such things without 
knowing that some degree of control will be lost. At bottom, the underlying 
purpose of the outbreak was to prove the ‘seriousness’ of Turkish involvement 
in the future of Cyprus (just as EOKA’s bombs had been designed to prove the
10. Michael Stewart to Harold Macmillan 22 September 1955 F0371/117711 RG1Q344/50.
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seriousness of the Enosis claim). To responsible officials in London the ‘grim 
story’ related in Stewart’s communication bore out the allegation from Greek 
sources that Prime Minister Menderes in Ankara «knew all about the busi­
ness». There was in this affair, too, a more general anti-Western vein deriving 
from considerations wholly unrelated to Cyprus, principally Turkish dissatis­
faction with the amount of aid they were receiving from the United States. In 
fact, as Stewart’s account at points implies, whilst the riots were aimed against 
Greeks and Greece in the first instance, they were also a warning to other 
countries as well, above all the United Kingdom. Although many Britons 
found this revelation of Turkish tactics repellent, it is suggestive that in some 
quarters there was an implicit ‘understanding’ of the violence which had been 
resorted to. An example came when Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of 
N.A.T.O., stated in an official meeting that the riots which had occurred in one 
member country aimed at the nationals of another member was «the biggest 
blow which had been inflicted so far on the prestige and ideals of N.A.T.O.», a 
view which Prime Minister Eden was quick to rebut as «an exaggeration»11. 
Curiously, it seemed for some while to fortify the British position to be held to 
ransom by Turkish actions.
From the autumn of 1955 the chief focus of the Cyprus problem shifted to 
the negotiations between the new military Governor, Field-Marshal Sir John 
Harding, and Archbishop Makarios. But meanwhile the Turkish Government, 
like its Greek counterpart, faced internal political difficulties of its own. On 20 
December 1955 Ambassador Bowker reported on the recent exchanges in the 
Grand National Assembly during which Ismet Inonu had attacked Prime Min­
ister Menderes both for being responsible for the Istanbul riots and although, 
(of course, there was a contradiction here) for having subsequently agreed to 
the ceremonial raising of the Greek flag in Izmir (an act carried out on October 
24 under considerable American pressure as a compensation to Greek ‘ho­
nour’). Bowker’s despatch stated:
Kasim Kufrevi, one of the leaders of the new Freedom Party, and for­
merly a prominent member of the Democratic Party, also referred to the 
House of Commons debate and the apparent progress in the direction of 
self-determination [for Cyprus] and demanded that the [Turkish] Go­
vernment should make their position clear. He said the reference to 
Cyprus in the Government’s programme remained vague.
In his reply M. Menderes, after refuting the accusations of his complicity 
in the riots and justifying the Izmir ceremony as a normal way of making 
amends among civilized nations, said that but for M. Inonu ’s weakness 
in dealing with the Dodecanese after the war the question of Cyprus 
would not have assumed its present importance. I report these exchanges
11. Anthony Eden note PREMI 1/1068.
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principally for the record since it is clear that whatever misgivings the 
Democratic Party Parliamentary Group may have on M. Menderes's 
recent handling of Turco-Greek relations, the riots and other matters 
connected with the question of Cyprus, his attitude on the two points of 
immediate interest in regard to the future of the island, self-determina­
tion and self-government, have the support of almost the whole [Tur­
kish] Assembly.
At the same time the raising of the ban on publicity on Cyprus following 
the abolition of martial law in Ankara and Izmir has already to some 
extent led to menacing comment on Cypriot affairs (and Greece). The 
effect of this may well be to give M. Menderes less room for manoeuvre, 
even in the unlikely event that he should wish to do so12.
It is worth noting from this extract that the chargés relating to the Istanbul 
riots for which, among other things, both Menderes and Foreign Minister 
Zorlu were to be hanged following the 1960 Turkish revolution, were already 
being exploited by Inonu and the Opposition alongside other internal dissatis­
factions. During the course of 1955 economic conditions in Turkey had taken a 
definite turn for the worse. The fractures which were later to break the regime 
first became visible at this time, and one effect was to make the Government a 
hostage to its own success on the narrow, but highly emotional, pivot of the 
Cyprus question.
Probably the fact that the September riots put Turkish policy under some­
thing of a cloud in terms of ‘world opinion’ meant that Turkish responses to 
the Harding-Makarios talks in Cyprus from October 1955 onwards were more 
muted than they might otherwise have been. Nevertheless, Turkey’s stance in 
this phase was to insist that any British ‘offer’ did not go beyond what had 
been previously tabled at the London Conference. The episode of the internal 
Cypriot negotiations witnessed a further intensification of Ankara’s ‘surveil­
lance’ of British policy. The flavour of this may be conveyed by a Foreign 
Office minute recording the remarks of the Turkish Ambassador to Britain 
when he visited the department on 1 February 1956:
The Ambassador thought that the latest interview between the Governor 
and Makarios had succeeded in putting the latter up against the wall. It 
was most important that he should not be allowed to escape from having 
to define his position towards the [constitutional] formula and having to 
state that he was prepared to cooperate and to repudiate violence...
The Ambassador said that he was very apprehensive of further reprisals 
in Turkey against the Greek population there. He had been told by 
people who should know that if any serious anti-Turkish incident or
12. Sir James Bowker to Harold Macmillan 20 December 1955 FO 371/117679 RG1081/1736.
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development occurred there was a risk of a massacre of Greeks at Istan­
bul which would make the riots of last September mere child’s play13 14.
Since what might be interpreted as an anti-Turkish development could be 
extremely broad, such warnings were not to be taken lightly, especially as the 
reiteration of ‘more riots in Istanbul’ became a sort of code for a Greco-Tur- 
kish war. Turkish pressure was not in itself the key factor in the deportation of 
Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles on March 9. But afterwards any move 
by the British to rekindle negotiations on a constitution, even had they wished 
to do so, was made more improbable by having to run the gauntlet of Turkish 
opposition. This was the case with the June 1956 proposals which would have 
introduced a measure of self-government and (crucially in terms of Greek 
Cypriot opinion) fixed a time-limit for deciding, under N.A.T.O. arbitration, 
the final status of the island. Bowker described the Turkish Foreign Minister’s 
hostile response when presented with a rough draft of this scheme, and drew 
the following conclusion:
I fear... that the Turks are pathological on the subject of self-determina­
tion and will adamantly refuse to see merits in any plan which fixes a 
date for it, however hedged around by conditions and safeguards.
My impression is... that if it is finally decided to fix a date for the possible 
application of self-determination it will have to be done without the 
agreement (or even the acquiescence) of the Turkish Government and 
probably with serious effects on Anglo-Turkish relations and a further 
exacerbation of relations between Turkey and Greece1*.
As Bowker afterwards summarized matters, the new British plan had 
«brought back with a rush all the suppressed doubts and misgivings which they 
[the Turks] felt during the negotiations with Makarios and a feeling that they 
will now have to go it alone». «Going it alone» was an ominous possibility, and 
as such calculations had now to be made as to the prospects for some unilateral 
military action by Turkey over Cyprus. The following extract is a précis of the 
judgements on this vital matter which was supplied to the British Foreign 
Office from their Ankara Embassy.
TURKISH MILITARY ACTION IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE CYPRUS QUESTION
The Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has officially denied Greek alle­
gations that Turkish officers are being sent to Cyprus and that Turkish troops 
are being trained for commando operations against Cyprus. Sir James Bowker
13. J. G. Ward minute, 2 February 1956, F0371/123868 RG1081/178.
14. Sir James Bowker Telegram No. 478 to Foreign Office 18 June 1956 F0371/123899.
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reports that he has no concrete evidence of any Turkish troop movements 
connected with the Cyprus issue.
2. Turkish military action in connection with the Cyprus question can be 
considered under three heads:
(a) an invasion of Cyprus while British troops are still there;
(b) an invasion of Cyprus in the absence of British troops;
(c) action against Greek territory in Thrace or the Aegean.
An Invasion of Cyprus while British Troops are still there.
3. Sir Sames Bowker excludes this possibility. Even if Cyprus became 
Greek, a Turkish invasion would be a remote eventuality if Britain retained a 
base there.
Turkish Invasion of Cyprus in the absence of British Troops.
4. Sir James Bowker does not comment on this. But he points out that the 
Turks would have ample resources for an unopposed landing. He records that 
the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff hinted that Turkey would take 
military action if Cyprus were ceded to Greece or there was a settlement 
unsatisfactory to Turkey. The Turkish Ambassador in Washington has hinted 
the same thing publicly.
Turkish Action against Greek Territory in Thrace or in the Aegean.
5. From the purely military point of view this would be easier than an 
invasion of Cyprus. Sir James Bowker thinks that the Turks might indulge in 
sabre-rattling demonstrations, but he doubts whether these would be followed 
up by invasion. It should be added however that the Turks have frequently 
referred to the ill-treatment of the Turkish minorities in Western Thrace andin 
some of the Aegean islands. Moreover it was the Treaty of Lausanne which 
gave Greece the title deeds to these territories, and the Turks have frequently 
said that if the Lausanne settlement in respect of Cyprus is altered, other parts 
of the same settlement should also be altered'5.
After the blocking of the plan of June/July 1956, the focus of a possible 
political settlement shifted to the work of the Constitutional Commissioner, 
Lord Radcliffe. Concern at the Turkish attitude to Radcliffe’s prospective 
conclusions led Sir James Bowker to draw up a broad analysis of ‘The Turkish 
attitude on Cyprus’. This is one of the most authoritative assessments of its 
kind in the official British records, and is therefore worth recording here in full:
THE TURKISH ATTITUDE ON CYPRUS
To those responsible for dealing with Cyprus, one of the aspects of the 15
15. J. A. Thompson minute 24 June 1956 FO371/123906 RGI081/1482.
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problem which often exasperates is the seemingly unhelpful and negative atti­
tude of Turkey towards any suggestion for a settlement. To them, it is natural 
to wonder whether every proper effort is being made to bring the Turks to a 
more reasonable frame of mind, and to convince them of the need of a settle­
ment and the advantages, from their own point of view, for Turkey’s essential 
interests. It may, therefore, be useful to attempt to summarise shortly the 
Turkish attitude to the Cyprus question and, in particular, its two most impor­
tant aspects, namely self-government and self-determination.
2. To understand the Turkish attitude over Cyprus, it is necessary to take 
into account the fact that the issue revives acutely the bitter memories of the 
Turco-Greek war of the early twenties, resulting from the Greek occupation of 
Ismir (Smyrna) and invasion of Anatolia. Though the Greeks were then driven 
from the mainland of Asia Minor, Turkey was obliged to accept, in the Lau­
sanne Settlement, the retention by Greece of a number of islands adjoining the 
Turkish Aegean coast. This string of Greek-held coastal islands was extended 
further by the transfer to Greece of the Docecanese after the Second World 
War. Turkey is absolutely determined that this process shall not be extended 
any further and that in no circumstances shall Cyprus pass to Greece (the fact 
that the Turkish Secretary-General has recently referred to the possibility of 
partition does not invalidate this). This is the fundamental consideration in her 
attitude to the Cyprus issue, presented to the world under the argument that 
owing to the special historical, geo-political and strategic circumstances of the 
case the principle of self-determination is not applicable.
3. For these reasons, Turkey’s attitude to any suggestions about Cyprus is 
determined by the extent to which they are likely to lead to Enosis, i.e. Greek 
annexation.
4. As regards the internal administation of Cyprus, Turkey does not oppose 
the principle of an advance towards self-government. She insists, however, that 
a Constitution should contain absolute safeguards against eventual domina­
tion of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots and should not be merely a transi­
tional stage towards Enosis. The main safeguard which she at present demands 
for the Turkish Cypriots is equal representation with the Greek Cypriots. 
There are indications that she realises this to be unobtainable and that she 
would be prepared to consider other alternatives when the time came. But 
meanwhile she insists that any discussion of a Constitution, before terrorism 
has been brought to an end and law and order re-established, will simply play 
into the hands of those Greek Cypriots and Greeks who regard a Constitution 
as a stepping stone to Greek annexation.
5. With the intention of ensuring that the Constitution should be given a 
fair run and not used merely as a preliminary step towards Enosis, the propos­
als put forward by Her Majesty’s Government last June aimed at putting the 
question of self-determination into cold storage by providing that there should 
be no discussion of it for ten years. This provision made no impression what­
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ever on the Turks, who maintained that the idea was wholly impracticable and 
unrealistic. They pointed out (I) that to fix a definite date when self-determina­
tion might be applicable was a further retreat from Her Majesty’s Govern­
ment’s previous attitude that self-determination could not be applied in the 
foreseeable future, and (II) that as soon as such a date was fixed, however long 
or short a period, the Greeks, regardless of any undertakings to the contrary, 
would inevitably bend all their efforts to advancing the date when self-deter­
mination should be considered and to whitting away whatever further safe­
guards had been applied to its application: in other words, that whatever 
conditions were attached to the consideration of self-determination would not 
be respected and that the only result of such an agreement would be that the 
Greeks would consolidate the ground won in order to advance further towards 
the realisation of their aims. All attempts to impress on the Turks the inge­
niously contrived network of safeguards for Turkish interests contained in the 
proposals merely evoked the response that in practice the whole network 
would prove no more substantial than a cobweb. They based their scepticism 
on this score on the unscrupulousness with which the Cypriot Ethnarchy and 
the Greek Government had followed their aims since the London Conference, 
the course of the negotiations with Archbishop Makarios and the repeated 
failure of the Greek Government to make any attempt to check the extremists.
6. It has been suggested that in our discussions with the Turks further 
emphasis should be given to the concern shown throughout by Her Majesty’s 
Government for Turkish interests, to the point even of consulting Turkey 
about their July proposals and dropping them out of deference to Turkish 
objections, and that we should urge that it is up to Turkey now to make some 
contribution towards solving this intractable question. The Turkish response 
to such a line is to draw a comparison between Turkey’s record over the 
Cyprus problem and that of Greece — to compare Greek insistance on press­
ing a claim to British territory at a moment of international tension and Greek 
support of terrorist activities in the Island with Turkey’s acceptance of the 
status quo, and to compare the systematic Greek exploitation of the Cyprus 
issue to undermine Britain ’s position in the Middle East with Turkey’s unwav­
ering support of British policy in the area. The Turks point out, moreover, that 
it is unreasonable to expect Turkey to accept proposals devised to meet what 
they regard as wholly unjustified Greek claims and containing, as they think, 
dangerous threats to Turkey’s national interests; that by yielding to Greek 
pressure to «do something about Cyprus», Her Majesty’s Government are 
forcing Turkey into a negative attitude, and that if any progress is to be made 
the Erst essential is that the Greeks, who alone are responsible for bringing the 
issue to a head, should show their good faith by withdrawing their support of 
terrorism and renouncing their annexationist claims.
7. The core of the problem is the extreme difficulty of devising proposals 
for solving Greece’s present demands over Cyprus which both give some satis­
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faction to the Greeks and offer what the Turks can be induced to regard as 
something of real advantage to themselves. The argument that Turkey owes it 
to her British ally to adopt a more helpful attitude to a problem which is 
costing the latter so much blood and treasure would, no doubt, evoke the reply 
that the problem is, on Britain ’s own insistance, a British responsibility. Such a 
reply might well be accompanied by the thought that the problem would never 
have been allowed to arise if Turkey had been allowed to retain her former 
possession of the Island. In addition, the Turks would probably repeat their 
offer (included in their reply to the July proposals) to consider with Her 
Majesty’s Government ways in which Turkey might co-operate with Britain in 
the Island. A repetition of this same offer would proba bly also be their reply to 
any insistense on the difficulties which the Cyprus Government were having in 
dealing with the terrorists.
8. It has been suggested that, if the Turks cannot be brought to accept 
proposals on their absolute merit, it might be pointed out to them that in the 
event of a change of British Government they will inevitably be presented with 
something far less favourable. The likely reply to such an argument it that so 
long as Britain has a Government which is resolved to maintain her position in 
Cyprus, Turkey will continue to give it her unwavering support and co-opera­
tion. If, however, the present British Government, or its successor, decided, as 
a result of pressure from one direction or another, or of internal difficulties in 
Cyprus, to adopt a course which in Turkey’s view was tantamount to abandon­
ing its responsibility in the Island, then Turkey would be obliged to re-consider 
her attitude and take such steps as might be appropriate to meet what would be 
an entirely new situation. (This in fact is the line which Monsieur Zorlu took at 
the London Conference last September.) The Turks are hard-headed Asiatics 
and they would mean what they said.
9. Finally, it should be pointed out that there is no difference of opinion 
among the political parties in Turkey about Cyprus, which is regarded by all as 
an issue of vital national importance.
10. It will be seen from the foregoing that the real difficulty of dealing with 
the Turks over Cyprus is that we and they approach the problem from different 
points of view and the arguments which to us seem reasonable and convincing 
are regarded by them as inapplicable to the basic realities of the problem. 
When asked what they regard as the proper way of dealing with the problem, 
their reply is that we should maintain the firm policy of suppressing terrorism 
in the Island, which is already showing important dividends, and meet pressure 
from any quarter for a further move by explaining all that has already been 
attempted towards a settlement and the reasons of its failure, and insisting that 
what now is required is that the Greek Government should use its influence to 
bring terrorism to an end and so re-establish conditions in the Island in which 
it will be possible to tackle the question of constitutional progress.
11. While all are agreed that every effort should continue to be made to get
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the Turks to agree to whatever proposals Her Majesty’s Government may wish 
to put forward about Cyprus, the foregoing is intended to expose some of the 
difficulties encountered in trying to induce them to accept arguments intended 
to appeal to their reason.16
Fundamentally the difference of approach between Britain and Turkey, 
conflated though they often seemed to others, sprang from the former’s as­
sumption that some expression had to be given —however mangled or quali­
fied— to conventional self-determination in Cyprus. Notably, however, 
Bowker did not draw from his own analysis the lesson that, since the Turkish 
position was so resistant to reasonable argument, the only course was to go 
ahead without them. This reflected the pattern of British prejudice over the 
Cyprus question, and to some extent also their wider interests in Middle East­
ern diplomacy.
During the summer and autumn of 1956 partition began to move to the 
forefront, though who first put the idea.into whose mind is not a matter to be 
gone into here. For the Turks the advantage of the partition demand was that 
it could be presented (at least to non-Greeks) as a credible basis for comprom­
ise, and because it provided an anchor against moving further down the 
‘slippery slope’ towards Enosis which Turkey always feared the Greeks were 
successfully pushing the British (with some help from the United States). In 
short, partition was a guarantee that the Turkish interest would not be over­
ridden. Recognition of this guarantee as a concomitant of self-determination 
emerged as the Turkish ‘price’ for refraining from outright criticism during the 
unveiling of the Radcliffe Report. This ‘price’ was clarified during the visit by 
the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, to Ankara in mid-December 1956. 
A Foreign Office minute on 17 December, after noting that the Minister’s visi: 
to Athens had gone badly, continued:
The meeting with M. Menderes [in Ankara] went very well. The Turks 
were as skillful as the Greeks were clumsy. What stood out most clearly 
was that the Turks had decided that, since H.M.G. are committed to 
self-determination, the only solution is partition, and the sooner the 
better. They will agree that it cannot be put into force immediately, but 
they would like to see H.M. G. committed to partition now by something 
that will, if possible, bind their successors. They fear that a [British] 
Labour Government would give all Cyprus to Greece. The point was 
made very delicately, but quite unmistakeably.
The Turks understand that HMG must go through with the Radcliffe 
exercise, but they do not like it and regard it as academic...
16. Memorandum by Sir James Bowker 17 October 1956 F0371/123931 RG1081/2226.
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Assuming that Ministers agree to proceed with the Radcliffe proposals 
and the [House of Commons] statement on December 19, the only point 
for immediate decision is... the draft of the statement, and especially the 
change [in wording] which the Turks ask for..]1.
The Turkish amendment to the draft of the imminent statement on Cyprus 
by the British Colonial Secretary was designed to put the partition option in a 
‘positive’ light. The Cabinet in London authorized a wording designed to meet 
this Turkish demand. That the fateful parliamentary announcement of 19 
December 1956 bringing partition into the ‘light of day’ was done not only 
under pressure from Ankara, but in something very close to the terms specified 
by the Turkish Government, is obviously a fact of some significance. It consti­
tuted the achievement of a major Turkish goal in securing practical leverage 
over the making of British policy. By the same token, should the British ever 
try to get off the partition hook that had now been set, the Turks were likely to 
lay all delicacy aside.
The Radcliffe exercise did indeed prove academic. Meanwhile, however, the 
continuing exile of Archbishop Makarios had become an albatross around the 
British neck. Even most of those privy to the original action in London and 
Nicosia recognized it as having been a mistake. The Archbishop’s release on 
April 6 1957 nevertheless was bound to anger Ankara. During the summer of 
1957 Turkish disillusionment with British policy intensified. Coming on top of 
the Suez shock, the decision on Makarios confirmed fears that British sover­
eignty in Cyprus should be discounted as a reliable factor. Indications that 
‘neutral’ parties —above all, the Americans and the Secretary-General of N.A.- 
T.O., Paul-Henri Spaak— were latching onto Cypriot ‘independence’ as a 
compromise solution also began to worry the Turks. On August 30 1957 
Bowker analyzed the state of Turkish feeling at this point with particular 
reference to the Turkish Government’s likely reactions to an outcome which 
might not reflect its optimal hopes:
I have read with interest Roger Allen’s comments in his letter 
(1081/810/57) of July 5 on the possibility of Greek military action against 
Turkey in the event of a solution of the Cyprus problem unfavourable to 
Greece being imposed on the Greek Government; and I should like to offer 
some comments on possible Turkish reactions to the reverse state of affairs — 
a solution unfavourable to Turkey.
2. It is necessary to start from the assumption that there is hardly a Turk 
alive who would not be delighted to have another crack at the Greeks. Equally 
all Turks are convinced that they would have no difficulty in inflicting a 17
17. Memorandum by D. P. Reilly 17 December 1956 F0371/123941 RG1081/2523.
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military defeat on Greece as crushing as the defeat in the War of Independence. 
Moreover, Turkish public opinion has by now reached a fairly generally in­
flamed state over Cyprus. It is in fact virtually the only aspect of Turkish 
foreign policy which is followed closely by all sections of the population includ­
ing even the peasants in the remotest areas. Objective discussion of Cyprus is 
almost impossible and passions (more anti-Greek than pro-Turkish communi­
ty in Cyprus) are quickly aroused.
3. There is little doubt in my mind that if the final solution for Cyprus was 
ENOSIS or if the Island was simply abandoned by Her Majesty’s Government, 
the Turkish Government would immediately move troops into Cyprus even if 
this led to general Turko-Greek hostilities on the mainland; and that no regard 
would be taken of protestations from Turkey’s allies including the Americans.
4. These two «solutions» are, however, extremely unlikely and the real point 
of this letter is to assess Turkish reactions in the event of their having to 
swallow a solution unfavourable to Turkey but excluding the extreme solutions 
mentioned above; e.g. independence, autonomy leading to a plebiscite or any 
other «compromise» solution acceptable to the Greek Government, but clearly 
unacceptable to the Turks. (I assume that any such solution would provide for 
the continued presence of British troops in the Island at least for the time 
being.)
5. In the event I think that any Turkish Government led by Monsieur 
Menderes or for that matter any other foreseeable Turkish Government would 
do their best to curb popular enthusiasm to have it out with the Greeks on the 
ground. The Turkish Government are too dependent on the Americans and 
too committed to their membership of NATO and the various other European 
«clubs», to risk all in such a cause.
6. Nevertheless the possibility exists that the Government might be forceo 
to give in to popular pressure probably through the medium of the armed 
forces. This would either mean the Government acting in collusion with the 
Army after succumbing to pressure or the resignation of the Government in 
favour of a temporary military Government on the grounds of «national emer­
gency». In this context it is relevant to quote an extract from a letter I wrote to 
Shattock at the Political Office with the Middle East Forces in August 1956 
(my letter 1201/8/56G of August 29, 1956) in connexion with a questionnaire 
sent to my Military Attaché: «Nevertheless taking into account the high pres­
tige and popularity of the Army and the fact that Atatiirk’s example is behind 
them, I consider that the Army would be capable of a military coup or of 
forcing the Government to accept its view on a political question in a national 
crisis. The Army’s loyalty is probably more to itself—and to what the Gener­
als might think are the highest interests of the nation— than to the State... It 
would be difficult to say in what circumstances the Army might move on its 
own initiative... but it is too sweeping to say «only in the event of Communists 
seizing power».
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7. In such circumstances popular pressure through the military leaders 
would probably be for one of the three following courses of action or at the 
worst for all three at once:—
(1) Military intervention in Cyprus itself.
(2) Military action against some of the smaller off-shore islands belonging to
Qreece.
(3) Military action against Greece itself.
Although all three of these possibilities would be eminently acceptable 
emotionally to the Turks, prudence would probably dictate to military leaders 
in the last resort that it would be better to avoid either coming into collision 
with British troops (in Cyprus) or the complete and irrevocable breach with 
NATO and the West which would probably result from an attack on Greece 
itself. They might, however, consider that they could get away with (2) above 
as a first step; that it would effectively satisfy the popular demand for action 
against Greece; and that it would also serve as a cogent warning of the possible 
further consequences if the unfavourable decision over Cyprus was not rev­
ersed.
8. All this is however pure speculation and in the event I think it is unlikely 
that anything of the kind would happen. Popular feeling could hardly become 
articulate in such a direction except through the medium of the armed forces; 
and as far as I can see there are at present no high ranking officers of the 
calibre and with the wide popular following of, say, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak or 
General Kâzim Karabekir who would be likely to lead such a movement. So 
long as Monsieur Menderes is in power he will probably also be in full control; 
and for all his capriciousness and unpredictability he would know very well 
how disastrous for Turkey the consequences of violent external action would 
be. He is a past master at conditioning Turkish public opinion to new circum­
stances and he would probably be able to satisfy whatever pressure there might 
be by some gesture such as a demand for the total revision of the Treaty of 
Lausanne, accompanied no doubt with dark warnings of the possibility of 
military action.
9. However, even assuming that he stopped short of actual military inter­
vention in Cyprus or war with Greece he might consider it necessary to open 
the safety valve sufficiently to dissipate the main head of steam in Turkish 
public opinion. The possibility of another senes of riots against the Greek 
populations of Istanbul and Izmir on the lines of the September, 1955riots but 
possibly not confined only to damaging property could not therefore be dis­
counted. Or he might well expel from Turkey all citizens of Greek nationality, 
including of course the Patriarchate, and sequestrate their property regardless 
of the likelihood of retaliation against the Turks in Western Thrace. I consider 
that actions on these lines would be the most likely consequences since they 
would to a certain extent satisfy public opinion and would enable the Turkish 
Government to bow temporarily before the popular storm without irrevocable
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damage being done to their foreign policy — the excuse of intolerable provoca­
tion and the absolute denial of governmental complicity (if there n'ere riots) 
would immediately be forthcoming18.
Paradoxically, however, once the Turks began to lose faith in the British, 
and fear the arbitration of others outside the area, they began to see advan­
tages in striking a deal directly with Greece. This logic, reviving the attractions 
of Greco-Turkish rapprochement, was also connected with the wider crisis in 
the Middle East during the Summer of 1957 revolving around a hostile Syria. 
In fact under these conditions there were detectible certain tendencies which, 
after many ups and downs, were to feed into the Zurich and London accords of 
early 1959. Michael Stewart, for example, writing to the British Foreign Secre­
tary, Selwyn Lloyd, from Ankara on September 6 1957 stated that whilst «it is 
almost 100% certain that the Turkish Government would never willingly ac­
cept independence for Cyprus... I believe that they might be induced to accept 
a solution which gave them the substance of partition, i.e. a physical stake in 
the Island without partition itself»19.
A physical stake in the island was the abiding aim of Turkish policy from 
the summer of 1957 onwards. That such a stake might be gained short of actual 
partition provided the potential scope for ‘give’ in Turkish policy. The ques­
tion was when and how this ‘give’ might become practical. By now the Turks 
did not trust the British to negotiate on their behalf. As such, they were highly 
suspicious of the fresh change of direction in British policy with the resignation 
of Sir John Harding as Governor of Cyprus and his replacement by Sir Hugh 
Foot in October 1957. One of the chief British problems was to find some 
means of packaging the ensuing Foot Plan so as to make it acceptable to 
Turkey. To meet this need the bait of a Turkish military base was dangled 
tantalizingly in front of Ankara’s nose, since such a base would in effect 
operate as a guarantee of partition when the moment for a ‘final solution’ to 
the island’s status eventually arrived. The tentative suggestion of a base was 
one of the difficulties which bedevilled the talks which the British Foreign 
Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, had in Ankara at the end of January 1958 (although 
the recent Turkish-Cypriot riots in Nicosia, suppressed by British Security 
Forces, also entered into the now very jaundiced reckoning). Here is an extract 
from the final session of those talks attended not only by Selwyn Lloyd and his 
Turkish counterpart, Fatin Zorlu, but also by Prime Minister Menderes:
M. Menderes said that he had been kept informed of the talks between
the Secretary of State and M. Zorlu. He earnestly desired to come to an
18. Sir James Bowker to J. M. Addis 30 August 1957 F0371/130098 RGC1034/121.
19. Michael Stewart to J. M. Addis (Foreign Office) 6 September 1957 F0371/130098 
RG10344/123.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 07:51:59 |
352 ROBERT HOLLAND
understanding in the tradition of Anglo-Turkish friendship. There were, 
however, important differences between the Turkish and British posi­
tions.
M. Zorlu said that he would explain the main points of difference... 
The first point of divergence was the form of political development in 
Cyprus. The Turkish Government did not understand the meaning of the 
word ‘communal’, which the Secretary of State had used at the previous 
meeting. It was important that the word ‘federal’ or ‘federative’should 
appear in the [new] British statement...
M. Zorlu said that the second point of divergence between the British 
and Turkish positions was the question of a Turkish base. It was very 
important for Turkey to have a base in Cyprus immediately. Indded, this 
was the essential preliminary to any further progress. The Turkish Go­
vernment had a far greater interest in the island that any other Govern­
ment. They could admit that the Greek Government also had an interest, 
but if this was stated it must be made clear that the Turkish interest was 
greater. The Turkish Government could not contemplate that other 
countries, even though they were in N.A.T.O. or the Baghdad Pact, 
should have a direct interest in Cyprus, though if the Americans wanted 
a base he would see no objection to that20.
Zorlu rejected any reference to ‘communal’ since it smacked of that minori­
ty status for Turkish· Cypriots which Ankara held to be wholly inadequate. 
More significantly, however, the omission here by Zorlu of any recognition of 
British interest in the island, if only as the current sovereign power, was a quite 
studied threat, indeed a calculated insult, to the British Foreign Secretary. 
There was also the sinister sub-text that if Turkey so excluded British rights, it 
was but a short step to making trouble for her by stirring up the Turkish-Cy- 
priots to violence (which she was, anyway, self-evidently doing). In these cir­
cumstances the key to British policy was a fresh assessment that the Turks (and 
Turkey) represented a greater threat to continued British rule on the island 
than EOKA (largely because of the reliance of the Internal Security machine on 
the Turkish community). Again, given the bias built into British policy, far 
from leading to the conclusion that the time had therefore come to tack to the 
Greek side, this assessment meant that henceforth the dominant British motive 
was to win back Turkish friendship. To do this, of course, one had to know 
what it was Turkey was really after. Was her optimal demand, for example, 
partition, or full rendition of the island — a return, that is, to 1878? Sir James 
Bowker in Ankara was instructed to address himself to this crucial impondera­
ble. He replied as follows on March 18 1958:
20. Bowker Telegram No. 225 to Foreign Office 30 January 1958 FO371/136330 RG10344/31.
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Please refer to your letter No. R GC10344/G of March 13 in which you put 
some questions about the Turkish Government’s position on Cyprus, with 
particular reference to their demand for partition.
2.1 think the Turkish Government came to adopt their demand for parti­
tion and nothing but partition as a final solution as the result of Nuri Birgi, 
when he was Secretary General, having convinced Monsieur Menderes that 
partition offered the only practical way of settling the question which would 
give some satisfaction to both Greece and Turkey and also be final. Michael 
Stewart recollects Birgi saying in the autum of 1956 that though partition was 
not an ideal solution, it would meet at least two out of three Turkish require­
ments, i.e. protection of the Turkish community and her security needs, but 
not her historical, i.e. territorial claims, and would provide a basis for the 
resumption of normal Turco-Greek relations. On these grounds the Turkish 
Government claim that, in demanding partition they are being both realistic 
and accommodating. Monsieur Zorlu maintains, as he told the Secretary of 
State during the Ankara talks, and as he has told me before, that he did his best 
to dissuade Monsieur Menderes from adopting this attitude, his view being 
that the Turkish answer to Greece’s undisguised aim of Enosis should be (no 
doubt for tactical reasons) to demand rendition. The decision to go all out for 
partition having once been taken, the Government’s colours were nailed in­
creasingly firmly to the public mast, particularly during and after the General 
Election.
3. I believe, then, that the Turkish Government’s demand for partition is 
genuinely intended to be their final demand and not a tactical manoeuvre ora 
disguised demand for rendition. I believe, too, that they are sincere in arguing 
that the drawing of one more, and final, frontier line between Turkey and 
Greece in this region, would enable the two countries to restore their friendly 
relations. Their basic conviction is that where Turkey has a physical land 
frontier with Greece, the latter will never dare seriously to attack what the 
Turks regard as their national interests. Although the Turkish Government 
have constantly kept alive Turkish complaints about the treatment of the 
Turkish community in Western Thrace, they do this, I am pretty sure, not 
because they are really concerned over the lot of the Turkish minority in 
Western Thrace, but in order to keep a rod in pickle for use as required against 
the Greek minority in Istanbul, and latterly also, of course, to support their 
case over Cyprus. So I think they genuinely believe that as soon as a line were 
drawn in Cyprus, on one side of which Turkey would be in sovereign control, 
the Greeks would no longer dare to make any further trouble for Turkey, or 
for the Turkish community, in the rest of the Island. I think also that, on the 
basis of this same idea, they genuinely believe that it would suffice to dra w the 
line without at the same time carrying out any significant exchange of popula­
tion. They are confident that once the line were drawn they would have little 
trouble in looking after their own national interests and that the Turkish
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Cypriots on the Greek side of the line would be assured of reasonable minority 
rights.
4. Of course the Turkish Government have so far studiously refrained from 
saying where they think the line should be drawn. On this point they would no 
doubt set their sights high (as they appear to be doing now on the question of a 
base) with the prospect probably of lowering them a bit in the course of hard 
negotiations.
5. Incidentally, as recorded in paragraph 3 of Foreign Office despatch No. 
73 (RGC 1192/11/G) of March 3, Monsieur Zorlu instructed Birgi to tell the 
Secretary of State that he was «under terrible pressure». I think it is probably 
true that he is under some pressure. I think that as a result of his talks with the 
Secretary of State he may well have imagined, and told the Prime Minister and 
members of the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group, that he had brought 
Her Majesty’s Government to the point of making some dazzling concession 
(in the form of a base) to Turkey and that they may now be asking him when 
this concession is going to materialise (see paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 
441). In this context it is necessary to remember that Monsieur Zorlu has no 
popular position in this country and is generally disliked by most of the Demo­
crat Party; success is therefore necessary for him if he is to keep his present 
position. Secondly, partition for Cyprus has now become a national slogan and 
it is quite possible that a large number of Democrat Party Deputies might 
threaten to desert if they thought that the Government were preparing to give 
way on this particular solution. If the number of these were added to the other 
Deputies who were dissatisfied with the Government’s economic or other poli­
cies, there might be desertions from the Democrat Party members on suffi­
ciently large a scale to threaten Government’s majority. To some extent there­
fore Monsieur Zorlu is telling the truth when he speaks of being under pres­
sure, though I doubt whether it is yet «terrible» and of course whatever pres­
sure there is is partly his own fault.
6. Though I am sure that a base now would be regarded by the Turks as a 
tremendously valuable bird in the hand, and possibly induce them to be less 
vociferous about partition, the fact that they have committed themselves so 
fully to partition, which of course is criticised by the Opposition as an undue 
concession, will continue to make it very hard for them specifically and public­
ly to withdraw from it unless they can demonstrate that they have got some­
thing equivalent (e.g. a base which in size amounts to the same thing) or 
possibly better (e.g. an equal share with the Greeks in the administration of the 
whole Island)21.
The nub of the Macmillan Plan which took shape after early March 1958
21. Sir James Bowker to J. M. Addis (Foreign Office) 18 March 1958 F0371/136332 
RG10344/110.
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was to secure Turkish compliance through de facto, or ‘administrative’, parti­
tion, whilst having enough elements of ‘self-government’ so as to secure even­
tual Greek agreement (though almost certainly not before the threat of out­
right partition worked its harsh magic on both Athens and the Greek Cypriots 
themselves). By now, however, the Turks had the British on the run, and there 
was a natural temptation to make the most of it and only relent when they were 
sure of their quarry. The public announcement of the plan (many elements of 
which later found their way into the Lancaster House settlement) took place 
against the background of severe communal disorders in Cyprus, beginning on 
8 June. Bowker reported on 20 June regarding these vital phases from the 
vantage-point of Ankara in the following very full terms:
The Turkish Government’s handling of the Cyprus question over the last 
few weeks has afforded an instructive demonstration of Turkish political me­
thods and diplomatic tactics.
2. To give the background it is necessary to go back to your talks in Ankara 
in January when Monsieur Zorlu, true to the Turkish characteristic of mistak­
ing inches for ells, chose to believe, and no doubt gave Monsieur Menderes to 
understand, that a Turkish base in the Island was to all intents and purposes 
«in the bag». The widespread feeling of bitterness and suspicion which followed 
the dissipation of this illusion, which I have little doubt was to some extent 
based on a genuine misunderstanding, was I fear further intensified by the 
proposal that the Turkish Government might consider releasing Her Majesty’s 
Government from their undertaking that self-determination should when the 
time came, be applied to both communities in Cyprus in exchange for a base in 
the early future, and again when the Turkish Government were told of Her 
Majesty’s Government’s intention to make a statement of policy on Cyprus 
which would be announced a month in advance but not communicated at once 
to the Turkish Government. Explanations of the reasons which made this 
procedure and time-table necessary —namely the formation of the new Greek 
Government, the British Parliamentary recess and Opposition pressure for a 
debate— fell on deaf ears, and the Turkish Government, no doubt genuinely 
fearful, despite reaffirmation received to the contrary, that Her Majesty’s Go­
vernment’s statement would contain provisions, e.g. for self-government, 
which in view of all that had gone before they would have to reject, decided to 
exploit the period between the preliminary and substantive statements in an 
all-out campaign in favour of partition, to which they had already committed 
themselves publicly as the only practical solution. That something of this kind 
was in their minds was made fairly clear to me by Monsieur Zorlu at a reception 
on the 25th of May. I told him on that occasion that I was personally confident 
that when the time came to communicate the plan to the Turkish Government 
they would not see in it anything to cause them great concern, though, as he 
might well imagine, it would not be a declaration of partition. Zorlu’s reply
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was to ask why, in that case, Her Majesty’s Government should make any 
statement at all. I explained again the reasons why at this juncture Her Majes­
ty’s Government were obliged to announce their policy and said I hoped that 
the Turkish Government would do everything they could to keep the Turkish 
public and the Turkish Cypriots calm until the statement was made. Monsieur 
Zorlu thereupon indicated that if, despite the Turkish Government’s objec­
tions, Her Majesty’s Government decided to go ahead with their intended 
statement, the Turkish Government would make things difficult.
3. From that moment the Turkish authorities not only did nothing effective 
to restrain excited speculation, but by every indirect means encouraged a mas­
sive popular outburst in favour of partition. The press, including those papers 
associated with the Government, was given free rein to indulge in a campaign 
of vituperation of Britain and British policy over Cyprus which excelled even 
their earlier impressive records. All the favourite incidents of the past, especial­
ly those relating to Britain ’s policy and behaviour in the First World War and 
after, were trotted out in more than usually colourful disguises to illustrate 
Britain’s ineradicable slipperiness and continuing favouritism of Greece. At a 
series of press conferences and monster meetings in Istanbul and other towns, 
held under elaborate security precautions, Dr. Kiiçük and Mr. Denktas the 
leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus, flanked by placards 
bearing such slogans as «Partition of Death», «Britain Beware» and the swing­
ing effigies of Makarios, vied with the leaders of student and youth organisa­
tions in speeches of the most inflammatory content. Repeated requests that the 
Turkish Government should use their influence to keep things calm evoked the 
bland reply that the Government were in fact doing all they could in that 
direction —witness their studiously moderate official statements— but that 
public speculation and anxiety over Her Majesty’s Government’s coming 
statement was so intense that it would explode with perilous results unless 
reasonable safety valves were provided. Meanwhile, no doubt as an essential 
part of the plan, all this violent pother was continuously relayed by Ankara 
Radio both to the home public and to the Turkish Cypriot community in 
Cyprus.
4. Reports received by the Government that the Turkish Cypriots were 
planning trouble were given scant attention when communicated to the Minis­
try of Foreign Affairs, and when, three days later, on the 7th/8th of June, the 
Turkish riots took place, the Turkish Government angrily complained of the 
danger to the Turkish communities in the villages from events for which the 
Greeks and the Cyprus Government were held to be wholly to blame. Reports 
which ha ve since been published in the foreign press and news agencies, partic­
ularly those emanating from the Reuter correspondent in Nicosia, that the 
trouble was the work of the Turkish Cypriots, have caused much righteous 
indigantion.
5. By this means, when the time came to communicate to the Turkish
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 07:51:59 |
ISTANBUL AND BRITISH RULE IN CYPRUS 357
Government the substance of Her Majesty’s Government’s plan on the 10th of 
June, an atmosphere of crisis had been established which left little hope that 
the plan would receive the calm and serious study for which Mr. Macmillan 
especially asked in his message to Mr. Menderes. There can be little doubt that 
the Turkish Government had made up their minds to reject the plan before 
even it was communicated to them. I believe that, in the event, they found that 
it was a good deal more favourable than they had anticipated, and indeed 
offered some substantial advantages to Turkey. But by that time they had set in 
train their great bid for partition and believing, presumably, that a little more 
of the same medicine would in the end produce a situation in which partition 
would be generally recognised as the only possible solution, the intention to 
reject the plan was upheld, though the more than usually futile content of their 
aide-mémoire and of Mr. Menderes’s reply to Mr. Macmillan’s message bore 
evidence of the difficulty which they must have had in formulating justifiable 
reasons for their decision. This was specially illustrated by the play made in the 
aide-mémoire of the fact that the plan made no mention of Mr. Lennox-Boyd’s 
statement of the 19th of December 1956, when Mr. Zorlu himself had admitted 
in a press conference held two days before that a reaffirmation of the principle 
enunciated in that message had been received a few days previously.
6. The fact that the period during which this drama was played out coin­
cided with a major internal political crisis in which Mr. Menderes was under 
severe criticism from his party on account of the increasingly grave economic 
situation, probably made the Government more than ever glad to be able to 
divert public attention to a national issue.
I think, too, that it probably made Monsieur Menderes, who seems to have 
been considerably exhausted by the internal conflict, more inclined than he 
might otherwise have been to leave the direction of Cyprus policy in the hands 
of his trusted lieutenant, Monsieur Zorlu. I had hoped that as a result of Mr. 
Macmillan ’s personal message, and the message which my United States col­
league subsequently conveyed from the United States Government, Monsieur 
Menderes might even at that late hour be induced to take the necessary initia­
tive to put the issue into its proper perspective. This hope proved vain and 
Monsieur Zorlu kept the reins.
7. In this savage game of make-believe, Monsieur Zorlu added some som­
bre touches of his own technique. At nearly all my interviews with him during 
this period his attitude was blustering and violent and on the occasion when I 
was summoned at midnight to receive complaints over the alleged failure of the 
Cypriot authorities to keep order and protect Turkish Cypriots, his anger, or 
display of anger, at the beginning of the interview was such that he was 
incapable of coherent speech. He also took the occasion of his interview with 
Mr. Randolph Churchill to say that he thought that I was partly to blame for 
the present situation in that I was personally prejudiced and failed to under­
stand the Turkish position.
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8. My NATO colleagues, and others, were used by Monsieur Zorlu as 
further instruments for spreading the Turkish gospel, and told on every occa­
sion that presented itself of the Turkish Government’s dire forebodings of the 
results of Britain ’s present Cyprus policy. After I had communicated the plan 
to the Turkish Governement both the German and American Ambassadors 
were instructed by their Governments to urge the Turkish Government to give 
the British plan careful thought. My United States colleague followed this up 
later with a personal message from President Eisenhower to Monsieur Mende- 
res. None of these approaches had any apparent effect.
9. When, at the request of Monsieur Spaak and the NATO Council, Her 
Majesty’s Government agreed to postpone their statement in Parliament for 48 
hours, my United States, German, Canadian, Norwegian, French and Nether­
lands colleagues were instructed to urge moderation on the Turkish Gover- 
ment and my Italian colleague, on his own initiative, drew Monsieur Zorlu’s 
attention to the great advantages which the British plan offered to Turkey. In 
some cases the representations strayed somewhat from the intent of Her Majes­
ty’s Government in agreeing to postpone their statement, particularly in the 
case of my United States colleague, who somewhat inadvertently spoke of Her 
Majesty’s Government’s readiness to ‘negotiate’ on the basis of their plan, 
while my German colleague, whether on his own initiative or instructions, 
seems to have taken the line that while the German Government had no views 
either for or against the plan, there might be advantage in an early tripartite 
conference. In justice to my Unites States colleague, it must be said that when 
he saw Monsieur Zorlu on a later occasion he explained firmly why Her 
Majesty’s Government had in his judgement to make their intended declara­
tion. The Turkish Government’s attitude in general to those approaches was to 
resent what they pretended to see as an attempt to bring pressure to bear on 
Turkey. As a further indication of Turkish innate susceptibilities where their 
own dignity is concerned, Monsieur Zorlu complained to my Norwegian col­
league that Her Majesty’s Government, according to him, had negotiated their 
plan with the United States Government before submitting it to Turkey, thus 
employing tactics which he described as reminiscent of the Nineteenth century. 
I had an opportunity of categorically denying the truth of this allegation when 
Monsieur Zorlu mentioned it to me later.
10. The culmination here of the exercise in the NATO Council was Mon­
sieur Zorlu’s communication reported in my telegram No. 936, in which the 
Turkish Government, after putting several glosses of their own on the Coun­
cil’s deliberations, expressed their readiness to attend a tripartite conference in 
which the British plan would be accepted as a basis for discussion alongside a 
Turkish plan for partition and, if necessary, also a plan submitted by Greece, 
and asking that if this were agreed Her Majesty’s Government should refrain 
from divulging the British plan when their statement was made in Parliament. 
At the time of signing this despatch it remains to be seen whether this seeming-
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ly: characteristic Turkish move was a final attempt to dissuade Her Majesty’s 
Government from announcing their plan and to revert to the position obtain­
ing some months ago where Turkey could confidently look forward to a Greek 
refusal to attend a conference and thereafter reiterate her demand for bilateral 
negotiations with the United Kingdom on partition, or whether the reference in 
the Turkish communication to the possibility of reconciling the British plan 
with the Turkish thesis of partition was an indication that the Turkish Go­
vernment were at last beginning to understand the advantages of the British 
plan from Turkey’s point of view and were searching for a face-saving means 
of modifying their first abrupt rejection of it.
11. Meanwhile the last act in the presentation of the Turkish case for 
partition had been played out two days before when the Grand National 
Assembly adopted unanimously a resolution giving the Turkish account of 
recent events in Cyprus and containing a message to be communicated to the 
Parliaments of the world.
12. It may be asked to what extent the Turkish Government have had the 
country behind them in their Cyprus policy and the methods employed over 
the last weeks to carry it out. I think there is no doubt that the methods 
employed have been successful in exciting and impressing large sections of the 
urban population, especially the youth, who have had access to the radio or 
attended the various mass meetings. I believe also that Mr. Zorlu has suc­
ceeded in getting his policy accepted and supported by the Democrat Party. 
The Opposition, while generally accepting partition, probably have doubts 
about the methods employed to bring it about, and I have learnt on good 
authority that at the closed session of the Grand National Assembly at which 
the Cyprus resolution referred to in the preceding paragraph was adopted, the 
original draft was considerably modified as a result of Mr. Inonu ’s firm inter­
vention, which received general support from the Democrat Party deputies. I 
have no doubt that thinking and responsible members of the public, particular­
ly among the business, professional and academic communities, know perfect­
ly well that the excitement of the last few days has been artificially stimulated 
by'the Government and assume that this has been done to divert attention 
from Turkey’s present economic difficulties, which are of much closer concern 
to them than Cyprus. The bulk of the agricultural population is unlikely to 
have been much affected. I have no doubt that when the Government choose 
to relax pressure the excitement will die down. Iam of course notin a position 
to say how serious and lasting the effect of the recent agitation has been on the 
Turkish community in Cyprus.
13. The lesson to be drawn from this sad chapter of events is that the 
present Turkish régime will go to any lengths to get what they want as long as 
they think there is a chance of getting it22.
22. Sir James Bowker to Selwyn Lloyd 20 June 1958 F0371/136338 RG10344.
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The last sentence of this despatch provides the key to understanding the 
course of Turkish diplomacy over Cyprus during the following months. British 
hopes that everybody (including ‘neutral’ N.A.T.O allies) could be bounced into 
accepting the Macmillan Plan having been frustrated, a prolonged (and in 
Cyprus often bloody) tension prevailed in which the British dilemma was to 
‘fine-tune’ the plan sufficiently to meet Greek needs whilst struggling to regain 
Turkey’s genuine cooperation. One highlight in this sequence was the visit of 
the British Prime Minister to Ankara in early August 1958. The following 
telegram from Macmillan to the Foreign Secretary back in London conveys the 
tension of this occasion and the Turkish views with which he was confronted:
Following from the Prime Minister to the Foreign Secretary.
.7 am just leaving Ankara for Cyprus.
We Finished our business with the Turks last night after three meetings, all 
of them short and only one of them pleasant — the last.
2. On Saturday night, at a working dinner party given by Menderes, I 
explained that I had been to Athens and was now in a position to tell Men­
deres, as I had promised him in London, what impression I had formed of the 
Greek Government’s attitude to the British plan. Menderes confirmed that the 
Turkish Government liked our plan as a whole. They expected us to put it into 
effect as it stood, and in any case were not interested in the views of the Greek 
Government. After some argument about what passed between us in London, 
however, Menderes invited me to state the Greek position. Accordingly, I said 
that the Greeks accepted the need for a period of peace and agreed that there 
should be a provisional arrangement for the next seven years. They liked a 
good deal of the plan itself, but they saw difficulties about the four points (see 
my telegram from Athens). I was very grateful to Menderes for accepting the 
plan as it stood. I suggested that he should tell me in the morning what he 
thought of the Greek points and give me some indication of their relative 
importance from the Turkish aspect.
3. On Sunday morning we ran into rough weather. The Turks were at their 
most suspicious. Zorlu was rude and truculent. Before I could enumerate the 
Greek points he interrupted to say that he wanted the same number of Turks 
on the Governor’s Council as Greeks; and partition to be added to partnership 
as the final solution. He said that any modification would upset the «economy» 
of the plan. The Turkish Government could not therefore support it if it were 
modified in any way. Not only that, but he must say now that the plan was 
quite inadequate. He would give me a memorandum in the afternoon to show 
what the Turkish Government now considered themselves entitled to ask for.
4. Leaving aside the bluster, Zorlu’s case was rational enough. He said that 
there were two methods: either negotiation ora «policy for action». He thought 
that we had decided on the latter. If that were so, Her Majesty’s Government 
knew the views of the Turkish Government and presumably those of the Greek
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Government, and it was for them to make up their minds. There was nothing 
to discuss. If, on the other hand, we wanted negotiation, then there must be a 
tripartite meeting and we had better know here and now what the Turkish 
Government would want by way of improvements to the plan to offset conces­
sions which we apparently meant to make to the Greeks.
5. It was depressing to find that Zorlu, and even Menderes, were unwilling 
to discuss the Greek points objectively and without commitment, let alone 
respond to a friendly suggestion that in the world situation now facing us it 
would be in Turkey’s interest if, by means of a slight adjustment of the plan 
which we had said all along was no more than an outline, we could obtain, if 
not the whole-hearted cooperation, at least a tolerable degree of practical 
cooperation from the Greeks. But at least neither Menderes nor Zorlu with­
drew their offer to give us full support if we put the plan into effect as it stood. I 
therefore decided to adjourn before matters got any worse, although there was 
still more than an hour until lunch.
6. We all met at the President of the Republic’s for lunch, but there was no 
business. I think the President said that he hoped that I would be pleased with 
the result of my visit.
7. In the interval before our last meeting, we reflected on what the Turks 
had said in the morning. It seemed to us what the Turks chiefly feared was that 
we would interpret any readiness to discuss points as amounting to a conces­
sion and that we would then go back with a new position to the Greeks, who 
would then raise further objections. The Turks, who maintained that they had 
already been pushed back to please the Greeks from annexation to partition 
then from partition to partnership, would next have to give up even partner­
ship. On the other hand, the Ambassador feels that the Turks really want the 
plan and want to revert to full cooperation with us in all details. It was 
probable therefore, if we made it clear that we were still on the «policy for 
action» and that above all that we would not go back to the Greeks, there was a 
reasonable chance that we could end on a happier note.
8. When we resumed therefore at 4.30p.m., I told Menderes and Zorlu that 
I thought that we now fully understood each other. If we put the plan into 
operation as it stood Turkey would give us full support. There was no question 
of negotiation on the plan and no need for discussion on this or that possible 
modification. Zorlu’s memorandum was then distributed (text in my imme­
diately following telegram), I said that this [grp. undec. ? document] as a whole 
seemed to go beyond the scope of a provisional seven-year arrangement and 
was therefore largely irrelevant to our present purpose. The first two para­
graphs had a direct bearing on the plan and I would take them into considera­
tion along with the Greek observations on the plan. For the rest, I quoted what 
was said in the memorandum, but of course I could not agree with it.
9. In order to bring the meeting to a close I said that I was now in fuB 
possession of the views of both the Turkish and Greek Governments. As 
regards the Turkish Government, they would give us full support if we put the
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plan into effect as it stood: if we introduced modifications they were under no 
obligations to support us. I would now return to London and decide my course 
of action, after which I would have a communication to make to both Go­
vernments. On this note we broke up in a very friendly atmosphere.
10. In the course of the evening when I entertained Menderes and Zorlu to 
dinner, we took the opportunity at various levels to assure the Turks that it had 
never been our intention to go back to the Greeks; the Turkish Ministers were 
affable; an anodyne communiqué was agreed; typically, Menderes eliminated a 
small barb which Zorlu had tried to insert in it. There were sundry expressions 
of desire for full cooperation with us and some indications that they were really 
keen on the plan.
11. The decision before us now is whether to go ahead with the plan as it 
stands or to take a chance on introducing some slight modification which 
might soften the blow to the Greeks without causing the Turks to run out. I 
shall think this over on the way home and consult the Cabinet tomorrow 
morning. However we decide, I think we must act within a matter of days22.
In the light of this interlude a senior Foreign Office official minuted:
The visit’s two main successes are (a) that it has reintroduced a note of 
confidence into Anglo-Turkish relations and (b) that it has enabled us to 
announce certain minor pro-Greek modifications of our plan without... 
forfeiting Turkish goodwill. On the other hand, the very fact that the 
Turks seem to have welcomed our revised plan whilst the Grreks have 
completely rejected it, suggests that we have still not struck quite the 
right balance; the sign of the perfect compromise would be that its publi­
cation evoked from both sides a mild but not fatal hostility23 4.
In fact Turkish suspicions of the Macmillan Plan were a variant of their 
Greek counterparts: that it was nothing more than a clever ruse by the British 
to stay in control of the whole island, even at the risk of a new war in Asia 
Minor. In fact it was, in part, because Athens and Ankara shared this insight 
that eventually there crystallized the process leading to the Greco-Turkish 
accord at Zurich in February. Turkish actions at this time have also to be 
understood in relation to anxiety that the British, having used them as a 
convenient proxy for so long, would at the crucial moment veer off in another 
direction and leave them in the lurch. Turkish violence (verbal and otherwise) 
was a message that the British had better think twice before contemplating 
such a gambit. Nevertheless, buffeted by regional instability underlined by the 
coup in Iraq, the Turkish Government came to accept that the new British plan
23. Harold Macmillan to Selwyn Lloyd 11 August 1958 FO371/136340 RGC10344/279.
24. Minute by R. Wade-Gery 20 August 1958 FO371/136340 RG10344/292.
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offered them the essence of their ambitions. This essence lay above all in its 
provision for a Turkish (as well as a Greek) Government Representative on the 
island with a role in the government of Cyprus. When the Turkish Ambassador 
visited the Foreign Office in London on 23 September 1958 he raised the issue 
of the Turkish Representative’s personal security in a suggestive manner (there 
was, of course, a real chance of assassination when the latter arrived on the 
island). The British official who received the Ambassador afterwards minuted:
I interposed to say that the responsibiliy for protection of the Represen­
tative’s person and his official premises would of course rest with the 
Cyprus authorities. I also put it to the Ambassador quite personally that 
any visible attempt by the Turkish Representative to organize security 
measures of his own would give rise to comment and would not... be in 
the Turkish Government’s own interest. Nevertheless, M. Birgi... urged 
that we should allow the Representative... to have some protection of his 
own. After some discussion in the course of which I pointed out as 
tactfully as I could the desirability of avoiding anything ostentatious, I 
said that I did not think there would be any difficulty about the Repre­
sentative ha ving some kind of discreet escort... M. Birgi seemed to regard 
all this as quite satisfactory, though I am not sure he was not hankering 
after something more in the nature of a bodyguard since he more than 
once... made gestures suggestive of outriders with lances25.
These gestures must have been picturesque to watch. Yet the image of a 
Turkish mounted guard in the streets of Nicosia, with full ceremonial honours, 
did conjure up Ankara’s basic goal through these events: a re-entry into the life 
and government of the island, either as sole ruler or (more realistically) in 
tandem with other interested parties.
From the feverish talk of a Greco-Turkish war in September-October 1958 
there emerged the first signs of rapprochement in the Zorlu-Averoff exchanges 
at the UN in December, the carefully prepared meeting of the two Prime 
Ministers in Zurich on 10-11th February, and the various signatures at Lon­
don’s Lancaster House on 19th February 1959. This is not a story the detailed 
development of which can be followed from British records. The British Go­
vernment knew nothing concrete of the Zurich talks till after their conclusion. 
Indeed, from the start of this turnaround the word used by British officials to 
describe growing Greco-Turkish agreement was ‘miracle’, which in itself indi­
cated just how nonplussed they were as to its motives. They were also to some 
extent frightened by it, since there was a possibility that British interests might 
get ignored in the unexpected rush to settlement. Very strikingly, it was inter­
vention by M. Zorlu which saved the lives of the convicted EOKA prisoners due
25. A.D.M. Ross 23 September 1958 F0371/136293 RGC10111/14.
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to be hanged in Nicosia at the end of December 195826. There could be no more 
poignant testimony to the altered configuration of affairs.
But although the British records only provide a very fragmentary picture of 
this climactic sequence, the key considerations at work can be ‘read between 
the lines’. When Michael Stewart went to see Zorlu in the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry on January 23, for example, and received a briefing on exchanges 
between Athens and Ankara, Zorlu stated that «a form of condominium by the 
‘back-door’ was the objective ...but we had to be careful not to frighten the 
Greeks...»27. This was, indeed, the heart of the matter (which is why to judge 
the final Cyprus independence constitution in the same conventional terms as, 
say, that of Kenya or some British Caribbean colony entering upon statehood, 
is to miss the point). In the event Lancaster House gave the Turks the nub of 
their demand for a renewed status in Cypriot affairs.
After Lancaster House there was continuing puzzlement in British circles 
concerning the rapidity with which things had unfolded. One senior official 
noted on 20 March «my own view is that there has been very little change in the 
essentials of the Turkish position over the past two years, but that the impor­
tant change of front on the part of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots needs 
analysis and explanation»28. This perhaps underestimates the degree to which, 
in the context of regional anxieties and domestic tensions in the final months of 
1958, Menderes and Zorlu were themselves shaken by the possibility that, far 
from surrendering to pressure as the British predicted, the full implementation 
of the Macmillan Plan might drive Greece into war. It also leaves out of 
account the internal fragility of the Turkish regime. But if Turkish tactics 
changed very radically, their aims stayed the same, whereas events —and fear— 
undoubtedly drove Greeks and Greek Cypriots into ‘a change of substance’. 
Later problems arose, at least in part, from the determination of Archbishop 
Makarios to claw back the advantage after independence which had been lost 
in the preceding period. No ‘nationalist’ leader in the age of decolonization was 
likely to have done otherwise, had they been in the same esoteric position.
In terms of Greco-Turkish relations, the dispute over Cyprus in the 1950s 
seemed at first to have had a happy ending. Between 7th and 12th May 1959 
Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averoff made a historic visit 
to the Turkish capital. As the new British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Bernard 
Burrows, wrote in his despatch on this event, to anyone who remembered the 
riots in Istanbul and Izmir in 1955, or the ‘Partition or Death’ meetings held all 
over Turkey in the summer of 1958, «the sight of Ankara and Istanbul festoo­
ned with Greek flags, and the spectacle of the visiting ministers driving down
26. See material in F0371/144593 RG1015/19.
27. Michael Stewart Telegram No. 146 to Foreign Office F0371/144639 RGC1073/8.
28. J. M. Addis minute 20 March 1959 F0371/144643 RGC1073/1.
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streets lined by waving Turkish school-children, had an air of marked incon­
gruity»29. As Burrows went on to remark, «informed and educated Turks had 
in many ways grown weary at the constant crisis over Cyprus»30, and welcomed 
this symbol of its liquidation. What —at least in the towns and cities, as well as 
the garrisons, of Turkey— they also looked forward to, however, was the 
liquidation of a regime for whom the Cyprus issue had been part and parcel of 
a rural and to some extent religious backlash in Turkish politics after the 
Democratic Party first came to power in 1950. Turkey, more than Greece, may 
be said to have ‘won’ the tussle over Cyprus between 1954 and 1959, but at 
least Karamanlis and Averoff lived to tell the tale at length. Adnan Menderes 
and Fatin Zorlu were soon to share a more dismal fate31.
29. Sir Bernard Burrows to Selwyn Lloyd 21 May 1959 F0371/144527.
30. Ibid.
31. At the climax of the Yasiàda Trials in Turkey during 1961 when it seemed death penalties 
were the likely outcome for some of the leading defendants, the British Government intervened on 
several occasions to save the life of Menderes, on the grounds that he had been such a close ally on 
the Cyprus question. British efforts to save Zorlu were less evident. See material in FO371/160791
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